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Abstract
When allocating indivisible resources or tasks, an envy-free allocation or eq-
uitable allocation may not exist. We present a sufficient condition and an al-
gorithm to achieve envy-freeness and equitability when monetary transfers are
allowed. The approach works for any agent valuation functions (positive or neg-
ative) as long as they satisfy superadditivity. For the case of additive utilities,
we present a characterization of allocations that can simultaneously be made
equitable and envy-free via payments.
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1. Introduction
A fundamental problem that often arises in several settings is that of allo-
cating items, resources, or tasks in a fair manner. There are several notions of
fairness that have been considered in the literature. Among them, two of the
strongest ones are envy-freeess (no agent should envy another agent’s outcome)
and equitability (every agent should get the same utility). When monetary
transfers are not allowed, there may not exist any outcome that is envy-free or
equitable. This leads to the question: under what conditions fairness can be
achieved via monetary transfers?
Contributions. We consider the situation where we use monetary transfers to
achieve both properties simultaneously. Our results include the following.
We first present a sufficient condition for allocations that can lead to eq-
uitability and envy-freeness by monetary transfers. In contrast to most of the
related results that focus on additive or positive valuations, the statement holds
for any superadditive valuations whether they are positive or negative. It also
leads to a natural and simple algorithm to achieve envy-freeness and equitabil-
ity. The result holds if we replace the payment balance conditions with the
condition that agents get subsidies.
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For the domain of additive valuations, we provide a complete characteriza-
tion of allocations that can lead to equitability and envy-freeness by monetary
transfers.
We use our insights to design a polynomial-time distributed algorithm that
finds an allocation and payment such that the new allocation achieves as much
social welfare as a given allocation and the outcome satisfies envy-freeness, eq-
uitability, and payment balance. Finally, we discuss issues around computation
and bounds for minimal payments to achieve fairness.
2. Related Work
In the fair division literature (see, e.g. [3, 5, 6]), envy-freeness [10] and equi-
tability [11, 20] are well-known fairness properties. When the items are divisible
goods, an equitable and envy-free allocation is guaranteed to exist [1]. On the
other hand, when considering indivisible goods, neither of the two properties
are guaranteed to be achievable.
In this paper, we consider achieving these properties with the help of mon-
etary transfers. Fair allocation with money is well-established, especially in
the context of room-rent division. A feature of most of the work in the area
is that each agent has demand for exactly one item (room)[2, 14, 16, 22, 23].
More general models where envy-freeness is achieved via side-payments have
been considered by Haake et al. [12] and Meertens et al. [17]. Chevaleyre et al.
[9] consider the distributed allocation of goods and focussed on convergence to
envy-free and efficient outcomes via trades among agents.
More recently, there has been focus on computing envy-free allocations when
agents have demands for multiple items and monetary transfers are allowed [12].
In particular, Halpern and Shah [13] popularized the problem of finding allo-
cations for which minimal subsidies will result in envy-freeness.1 In followup
work, the computational of minimal subsidies has been considered in further
depth both from the perspectives of exactly minimal subsidies [7] and approx-
imately minimal subsidies [8]. In our model, the valuations can be positive or
negative and we additionally target equitability. In particular, we use a simple
formula for the payment given to each agent.
3. Setup
We consider the setting in which there is a set N of n agents and a set T of
m tasks . Each agent i ∈ N has a valuation function vi : 2T → R. The function
vi specifies a value vi(A) for a given bundle A ⊆ T . The value can be positive
or negative. We assume that vi(∅) = 0 for all i ∈ N .
1The problem of computing minimal subsidies to achieve fairness can be viewed under the
framework of “control of fair division” [4] whereby fairness is achieved by minimal modification
to the original problem.
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The valuation function of an agent i is supermodular if for each i ∈ N , and
A,B ⊆ T , vi(A ∪ B) ≥ vi(A) + vi(B) − vi(A ∩ B). The valuation function of
an agent i is additive if for each i ∈ N , and A,B ⊆ T such that A ∩ B = ∅,
the following holds: vi(A ∪ B) = vi(A) + vi(B). The valuation function of an
agent i is superadditive if for each i ∈ N , and A,B ⊆ T such that A ∩ B = ∅,
the following holds: vi(A ∪ B) ≥ vi(A) + vi(B). Note that supermodularity
and additivity are stronger conditions than superaddivity. We assume that
valuations satisfy the weaker notion of superaddivity.
An allocation X = (X1, . . . , Xn) is a partitioning of the tasks into n bundles
where Xi is the bundle allocated to agent i. For an allocation X , the social
welfare SW (X) is
∑
i∈N vi(Xi).
An outcome is a pair consisting of the allocation and the payments made by
the agents. Formally, an outcome is a pair (X, p) where X = (X1, . . . Xn) is the
allocation that specifies bundle Xi ⊆ T for agent i and p specifies the payment
pi made by agent i. If pi is negative, it means agent i gets money. We say that
p is balanced if
∑
i∈N pi = 0.
An agent i’s utility for a bundle-payment pair (Xj , pj) is ui(Xj , pj) =
vi(Xi)−pj. In other words, we assume quasi-linear utilities. An outcome (X, p)
is envy-free if for all i, j ∈ N , it holds that ui(Xi, pi) ≥ ui(Xj , pj). An outcome
(X, p) is equitable if for all i, j ∈ N , ui(Xi, pi) = uj(Xj , pj). An allocation X is
envy-freeable if there exists a payment function p such that (X, p) is envy-free.
An allocationX is equitable-convertible if there exists a payment function p such
that (X, p) is equitable. An allocation X is EFEQ-convertible if there exists a
payment function p such that (X, p) is both equitable and envy-free.
For any given allocation X , the corresponding envy-graph is a complete
directed graph with vertex set N . For any pair of agents i, j ∈ N the weight of
arc (i, j) is the envy agent i has for agent j under the allocation X : w(i, j) =
vi(Xj) − vi(Xi). For any path or cycle C in the graph, the weight of the C is
the sum of weights of arcs along C.
4. Sufficient and necessary conditions to achieve fairness
We note that every allocation is trivially equitable-convertible: each agent
can be given money so that their utility is equal to maxi∈N vi(Xi). On the other
hand, not every allocation is envy-freeable or EFEQ-convertible.
We say that an allocation is reassignment-stable, if it maximizes the social
welfare across all reassignments of its bundles to agents. Halpern and Shah [13]
assumed positive additive utilities and presented the following elegant charac-
terization of envy-freeable allocations.
Theorem 1. Under positive additive utilities, the following conditions are equiv-
alent for a given allocation:
(i) the allocation is envy-freeable
(ii) the allocation is reassignment-stable
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(iii) for the allocation, there is no positive weight cycle in the corresponding
envy-graph
The equivalence between the first two conditions has been proved previ-
ously (see e.g., Haake et al. [12] and Mu’alem [18]). Reassignment stability was
referred to as local-efficiency by Mu’alem [18].
We explore the conditions under which an allocation is EFEQ-convertible.
Firstly, we show that even for positive additive utility, reassignment-stability
is not sufficient to simultaneously achieve envy-freeness and equitability via
payments.
Example 1. Even for positive additive valuations and a given envy-freeable
allocation, there may not exist any payments to the agents to achieve both envy-
freeness and equitability. Consider an instance with the following additive util-
ities. We consider an allocation X indicated with the squares in which agent 1
gets a and 2 gets b.
a b
1 200 100
2 2 1
The allocation is envy-freeable because it is reassignment-stable. We show
that there exist no payments to achieve both envy-freeness and equitability si-
multaneously. Without loss of generality suppose that agents are paid money.
The minimum amount needed to obtain equitability is to pay 199 to agent 2. We
can maintain equitability by giving equal amounts of money to both the agents.
Note however, that the outcome will continue having envy. Agent 1 envies agent
2: ui(X1, p1) = 200 + 0 < 100 + 199 = u1(X2, p2).
The example above shows that reassignment-stability is not sufficient to
achieve envy-freeness and equitability. Reassignment-stability was the key tech-
nique used by Halpern and Shah [13] and Brustle et al. [7] in their algorithmic
results to achieve envy-freeness. In our quest to achieve both envy-freeness and
equitability via monetary transfers, we focus on allocations that are transfer-
stable. We say that an allocation X is transfer-stable if there exist no i, j ∈ N
such that vi(Xi∪Xj) > vi(Xi)+vj(Xj). We note that under additive valuations,
transfer-stability is stronger than the reassignment-stability property.
Lemma 1. Under additive valuations, if an allocation is transfer-stable, then
it is reassignment-stable.
Proof. Suppose there exists a reassignment which increases total welfare. This
means that the movement of at least one bundle Xj to some agent i increases
the social welfare, which implies that the allocation is not transfer-stable.
Since transfer-stability is a stronger property than reassignment-stability, a
natural question is whether it can be used to achieve stronger fairness guaran-
tees. We answer the question in the affirmative in the following lemma. The
lemma applies to the class of superadditive valuations.
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Lemma 2. For a transfer-stable allocation X, suppose each agent i makes a
payment equal to pi = vi(Xi)− SW (X)/n. Then if agent valuations are super-
additive, the outcome (X, p) is envy-free and equitable.
Proof. We first want to prove envy-freeness: for all i, j ∈ N , it holds that
ui(Xi, pi) ≥ ui(Xj , pj). By transfer-stability of allocation X ,
vi(Xi) + vj(Xj) ≥ vi(Xi ∪Xj).
Since vi is superadditive, it follows that
vi(Xi ∪Xj) ≥ vi(Xi) + vi(Xj).
By combining the two inequalities above, we get
vi(Xi) + vj(Xj) ≥ vi(Xi) + vi(Xj)
⇐⇒ vj(Xj) ≥ vi(Xj)
⇐⇒ 0 ≥ vi(Xj)− vj(Xj)
⇐⇒ vi(Xi)− vi(Xi) + SW (X)/n
≥ vi(Xj)− vj(Xj) + SW (X)/n
⇐⇒ vi(Xi)− (vi(Xi)− SW (X)/n)
≥ vi(Xj)− (vj(Xj)− SW (X)/n)
⇐⇒ vi(Xi)− pi ≥ vi(Xj)− pj
⇐⇒ ui(Xi, pi) ≥ ui(Xj , pj).
The last inequality indicates that agent i is not envious of j and hence (X, p)
satisfies envy-freeness.
Next, we argue that the outcome (X, p) satisfies equitability. Each agent
i ∈ N gets utility vi(Xi)−pi = vi(Xi)−(vi(Xi)−SW (X)/n) = SW (X)/n. Since
each agent has the same utility SW (X)/n, the outcome satisfies equitability.
The payment function pi = vi(Xi) − SW (X)/n used in the lemma is not
new. It is referred to as the Knaster payments [15] and is inspired by the idea
that each agent should get utility that is at least the proportionality guarantee
vi(T )/n that was popularized by Steinhaus [21]. In the literature on fair allo-
cation with money, Knaster payments have typically been applied on welfare
maximizing allocations. Raith [19] discusses them prominently in the context
of 2 agents and additive valuations. We show that it is sufficient to consider
superadditive valuations and transfer-stable allocations for Knaster payments
to achieve both equitability and envy-freeness.
Our insights also show that any social welfare maximizing allocation is
EFEQ-convertible.
Corollary 1. For superadditive utilities, a social welfare maximizing allocation
is EFEQ-convertible.
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Proof. A social welfare maximizing allocation is transfer-stable. By Lemma 2,
it is EFEQ-convertible.
In Lemma 2, we have shown that for (super)additive valuations, transfer-
stability is a sufficient condition to simultaneously achieve equitability and envy-
freeness via payments. Next, we show that transfer-stability is also a necessary
condition.
Lemma 3. Under additive utilities, if an allocation is EFEQ-convertible, then
it is transfer-stable.
Proof. Suppose an allocation X is not transfer-stable. Then there exist agents
i, j ∈ N such that
vi(Xj) > vj(Xj)
The inequality is depicted in Figure 1.
i
Xi Xj
vi(Xi) vi(Xj)
j vj(Xi) vj(Xj)
<
Figure 1: A case in the proof of Lemma 3
If X is not envy-freeable, we are done so we assume that X is envy-freeable.
Then it must be that
vj(Xi) ≤ vi(Xi)
or we can swap the allocations of i and j to get a welfare improvement which
means that is not envy-freeable which implies that it is not EFEQ-convertible.
The case is depicted in Figure 2.
i
Xi Xj
vi(Xi) vi(Xj)
j vj(Xi) vj(Xj)
<≤
Figure 2: A case in the proof of Lemma 3
By the characterization result of Halpern and Shah [13], we know that X
does not admit an envy-cycle. Therefore, either
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vi(Xi) ≥ vi(Xj)
or
vj(Xj) ≥ vj(Xi)
We first consider the case vi(Xi) ≥ vi(Xj) which is depicted in Figure 3.
i
Xi Xj
vi(Xi) vi(Xj)
j vj(Xi) vj(Xj)
<≤
≥
Figure 3: A case in the proof of Lemma 3
Since vi(Xj) > vj(Xj), it follows that
vi(Xi) ≥ vi(Xj) > vj(Xj).
Since i gets a strictly higher value than j from her allocation, we need to
pay money to agent j to ensure equitability. In particular, agent j is paid
amount vi(Xi)− vj(Xj). In that case agent i’s estimation of agent j’s outcome
is vi(Xj)+(vi(Xi)−vj(Xj)) where we know that vi(Xi)−vj(Xj) > 0. Therefore
agent i is envious of agent j. Hence X is not EFEQ-convertible.
i
Xi Xj
vi(Xi) vi(Xj)
j vj(Xi) vj(Xj)
<≤
≤
Figure 4: A case in the proof of Lemma 3
In Figure 3, we assumed that vj(Xj) < vj(Xi). Next we consider the other
case vj(Xj) ≥ vj(Xi) which is depicted in Figure 4.
We distinguish between two cases (a) vi(Xi) ≥ vi(Xj) and (b) vi(Xi) <
vi(Xj).
We already considered case (a) vi(Xi) ≥ vi(Xj) in the previous analysis
(Figure 3). Therefore, we now consider case (b) and assume that vi(Xi) <
vi(Xj) which is depicted in Figure 5.
We distinguish between two further final cases: case vi(Xi) ≥ vj(Xj) and
the case vi(Xi) < vj(Xj).
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iXi Xj
vi(Xi) vi(Xj)
j vj(Xi) vj(Xj)
<≤
≤
<
Figure 5: A case in the proof of Lemma 3
(i) vi(Xi) ≥ vj(Xj) which is depicted in Figure 6.
i
Xi Xj
vi(Xi) vi(Xj)
j vj(Xi) vj(Xj)
<≤
≤
<
≥
Figure 6: A case in the proof of Lemma 3
Since vi(Xi) < vi(Xj), agent 1 is envious of agent 2 and needs money to
remove the envy. On other hand, we know that vi(Xj) > vj(Xj) so agent
2 needs more money to achieve equitability. Both the properties cannot
be met.
(ii) vi(Xi) < vj(Xj) which is depicted in Figure 7.
i
Xi Xj
vi(Xi) vi(Xj)
j vj(Xi) vj(Xj)
<≤
≤
<
<
Figure 7: A case in the proof of Lemma 3
Since vi(Xi) < vi(Xj), agent 1 is envious of agent 2 and needs money to
remove the envy. The exact amount needed to remove envy is vi(Xj) −
vi(Xi). But then the new utility of agent i is vi(Xj) which we know (see
Figure 7) is more than vj(Xj) so equitability is violated.
We have proved that in all the cases, if an allocation is not transfer-stable,
then it is not EFEQ-convertible.
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We obtain the following result: transfer-stability characterizes EFEQ-
convertible allocations.
Theorem 2. Under additive utilities, an allocation is EFEQ-convertible if and
only if it is transfer-stable.
Proof. The statement follows from Lemma 2 and Lemma 3.
Corollary 2. Assuming that we have access to an oracle that gives the utility of
an agent for a bundle in constant time, then for additive valuations, there exists
a O(n2) algorithm to check whether a given allocation is EFEQ-convertible.
Proof. By Theorem 2, we need to check whether the allocation is transfer-stable
or not.
5. An algorithm to achieve fairness with payments
The following lemma shows that a greedy distributed approach can achieve
a transfer-stable allocation.
Lemma 4. Suppose there exists an oracle that computes the value of an agent
for a bundle of tasks in time f(I). Then, for any given allocation X, a transfer-
stable allocation can be computed in O(n4f(I)) such that SW (Y ) ≥ SW (X).
Proof. We take any pair of agents i, j ∈ N and check if vi(Xi ∪Xj) > vi(Xi) +
vj(Xj). This can be checked in time O(f(I)m) for a pair of agents and in
O(f(I)n2) for all pairs of agents. If vi(Xi ∪Xj) > vi(Xi) + vj(Xj), we give the
allocation of j to agent i which results in agent j getting an empty bundle. With
each such operation the total social welfare increases. Hence, we the process
terminates. Next, we prove that the process terminates in a polynomial number
of steps.
With each operation, one of the two cases occurs. The first case is that
an additional agent j completely loses her bundle. When a bundle going to
another agent who has a non-empty bundle, then the number of agents who
have an empty bundle increases. Such operations can happen at most n − 1
times. Now suppose that the the number of agents who have an empty bundle
does not increase. This is only possible in the case that that agent i had an
empty allocation who gets the bundle Xj . Since each transfer of a bundle is
welfare improving, it cannot happen that a bundle is returned to an agent i.
Therefore such operations can happen at most n− 1 times until the bundle will
not move to any agent with an empty allocation.
Hence these operations can happen at most n2 times until no more transfers
are possible.
Lemma 2 and Lemma 4 give us an easy constructive method to achieve envy-
freeness and equitability. The method is presented as Algorithm 1. We use the
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algorithm in the proof of Lemma 4 to obtain a transfer-stable allocation.2 After
that we use the payment function specified in Lemma 2 to achieve envy-freeness
and equitability. Algorithm 1 leads to the following theorem.
Algorithm 1 Envy-freeness and equitability with payments
Input: Allocation Y and valuations functions vi for each agent i ∈ N .
Output: Allocation X and payment function p
1: Allocation X ←− Y
2: while there exists some i, j ∈ N s.t. vi(Xi ∪Xj) > vi(Xi) + vj(Xj) do
3: Xi ←− Xi ∪Xj
4: Xj ←− ∅
5: end while
6: For each agent i, pi ←− vi(Xi)− SW (X)/n
7: p′i ←− pi −max{pj : j ∈ N, pj > 0}
8: return (X, p) where p is balanced or (X, p′) where p′ is negative.
Theorem 3. Suppose agents have superadditive valuations. Then for a given
allocation Y , an allocation X and payment function p can be computed in poly-
nomial time such that
(i) the outcome (X, p) is equitable and envy-free,
(ii) SW (X) ≥ SW (Y ), and
(iii) p is balanced.
Note that our result allows for some payments to be positive, i.e., some
agents need to pay money. If we insist on simply using subsidies from a third
party to achieve envy-freeness, then we can find the largest payment p′i made
by an agent i and give each agent an additional amount of p′i so that agents
only get money and do not need to give money. To be precise, if the balanced
payment is p, we can get negative or zero payments p′ as follows: p′i is set to
pi −max{pj : j ∈ N, pj > 0}. By doing this, we obtain the next theorem.
Theorem 4. Suppose agents have superadditive valuations. Then for a given
allocation Y , an allocation X and payment function p′ can be computed in poly-
nomial time such that
(i) the outcome (X, p′) is equitable and envy-free,
(ii) SW (X) ≥ SW (Y ), and
(iii) for each i ∈ N , p′i ≤ 0.
2In practice in several domains such as routing-based task allocation, one would expect
most reasonable and balanced allocations to be transfer-stable.
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EFEQ-convertible ⇐⇒
=
⇒
=
⇒
envy-freeable ⇐⇒
transfer-stable
reassignment-stable
=
⇒
equitable-convertible ⇐⇒
=
⇒
no restriction
Figure 8: Properties of allocations under additive valuations
Note that if we are not given an initial allocation, then we can achieve an
outcome satisfying envy-freeness and equitability in an even simpler way. We
bundle all the tasks together and then give the bundle T to an agent i for which
value vi(T ) is the highest. By construction, the allocation is transfer-stable. We
then implement the payment function as specified in Algorithm 1.
6. Minimal payments to achieve fairness
When using payments to achieve fairness, one may want to use the mini-
mal exchange of money or subsidy to achieve fairness. The problem has been
explored by Halpern and Shah [13] and Brustle et al. [7] when the goal is envy-
freeness.
Suppose a given allocation X is EFEQ-convertible. Then there is a linear-
time algorithm to compute the minimal payments to achieve both envy-freeness
and equitability. The key insight is that for EFEQ-convertible allocations,
it is sufficient to simpy focus on achieving equitability. Any additional and
uniform payment for all agents does not affect envy-freeness. Therefore, we
can give agents sufficient money to ensure that each agent has utility equal to
maxi∈N vi(Xi). Next, we consider the problem in which we can choose a suitable
allocation so as to require minimal payments to acheive fairness.
Theorem 5. Computing the minimum payments to simultaneously achieve
envy-freeness and equitability is strongly NP-hard. Unless P = NP, there exists
no deterministic polynomial-time algorithm that approximates within any given
positive factor the minimum payments to simultaneosly achieve envy-freeness
and equitability.
The proof follows from the fact that checking whether there exists an envy-
free allocation (that requires zero payments to achieve envy-freeness) is NP-
complete if the agents have identical valuations. Under identical valuations,
envy-freenss also implies equitability. The inapproximability result follows from
the fact than even checking whether zero payment is required is NP-hard.
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In order to achieve reasonable bounds on the maximum subsidy to achieve
envy-freeness, Halpern and Shah [13] and Brustle et al. [7] assume valuations
in which vi(t) ≤ 1 for all i ∈ N and t ∈ T . Our goal is to achieve envy-
freeness and equitability simultaneously. We first note that we inherit any lower
bounds on subsidies required to get envy-freeness. Therefore, when an EFEQ-
convertible allocation is given, the minimum subsidy required is (n−1)m in the
worst case. We also observe that at least (n − 1)m payment may be required
even when an EFEQ-convertible allocation is not given and we can choose an
EFEQ-convertible allocation intelligently. The reason is that in order to achieve
transfer-stability, it may be the case that all the items need to be given to the
same agent.
7. Conclusions
Achieving fairness via payments is an interesting reseach direction. In this
paper, we focussed on envy-freeness and equitability and presented a character-
ization of allocations that are EFEQ-convertible allocation.
Figure 8 highlights some of the insights from this paper and the paper of
Halpern and Shah [13]. It will be interesting to explore other desirable fairness
properties.
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